Household debt on the peripheries of Europe : New constellations since 2008 by Bródy, Luca Sára & Pósfai, Zsuzsanna
PERIFÉRIA WORKING PAPERS ▪ 3.
LUCA SÁRA BRÓDY 
ZSUZSANNA PÓSFAI




Periféria Working Papers / Periféria Tanulmányok 
Volume 3.
Written by: Luca Sára Bródy and Zsuzsanna Pósfai
Project coordination, workshop organizing: Luca 
Sára Bródy and Zsuzsanna Pósfai
English proofreader: György Bihari
Images: Kata Varsányi | Stanislav Kondratiev & 
Huzni Mhmd & Janko Ferlic & Akhi art & George 
Becker & Matheus Bertelli from pexels.com | Pete 
Riches/Demotix/Corbis from theguardian.com
The project leading to this publication was 
financed by the Bertha Foundation in the 
framework of the Bertha Challenge 2019.
www.berthafoundation.org
Many thanks to the participants of the workshop 
“Household debt on the peripheries of Europe: New 
constellations since 2008”, which was organized 
by Periféria Policy and Research Center on the 22-
23rd of November 2019 in Budapest, Hungary. 
This publication largely follows the structure of the 
workshop, and important contributions were also 
made by participants in the course of editing. We 
include the program of the workshop at the end of 
the booklet.
Published by: Periféria Policy and Research Center 
(Periféria Közpolitikai és Kutatóközpont)
1074 Budapest, Barát u. 8.
Series editor: Márton Czirfusz
Budapest, 2020
Printed by: Prime Rate Kft. 
1044 Budapest, Megyeri út 53.







This work is licensed under the Creative Commons 




The financialization of housing in Southern and Eastern Europe 11
Relations of dependency in Europe 11
The variegated financialization of housing 14
Households and the debt burden 20
Institutional changes in household lending: trajectories of the European periphery  27
The drivers of the pre-crisis debt boom  29
The effects of the 2008 financial and economic crisis  34
Managing the post-crisis era: cleaning toxic portfolios for a new loan cycle 39
Beyond mortgages: various forms of non-mortgage debt 45
Growth of consumer loans and personal loans  46
The stigmatization of consumer loans among the poor  48
Arrears on utility bills and the growing energy divide  51
Informal moneylending on the periphery of society 55
The implications of debt for housing 61
Debt as a form of accumulation by dispossession  61
Moral imaginaries of homeownership and debt 64
Forms of intervention and political demands relating to household debt 69
Various interests relating to debt 69
How to intervene as engaged researchers – shaping the narrative 71
Building structures that point towards a different housing system 72
Examples of movements against debt and an outlook on 2020 73
References and workshop program 77
1
This publication focuses on the issue of household debt 
on the Southern and Eastern peripheries of Europe. 
We explore common patterns intending to understand 
what specific forms of household debt arise in these 
countries. Our claim is that relations of dependency 
between countries of the economic periphery and core 
of Europe also influence how household indebtedness 
unfolds in Southern and Eastern Europe. We aim to 
shed light on the changing institutional environment of 
household debt, and on the far-reaching, often unseen 
social consequences of household indebtedness. 
We largely base the content of this publication on a 
workshop organized by Periféria Policy and Research 
Center in November 2019 in Budapest. This workshop 
was organized as part of the Bertha Challenge project 
proposed by Zsuzsanna Pósfai and Periféria Center. In 
the frame of this Bertha Foundation fellowship, fellows 
around the world sought responses to the question of 
how the nexus between property, profit and politics 
contributes to land and housing injustice, while also 
exploring possibilities for going against this process. 
We launched a project on household indebtedness and 
its relation to housing dispossession. The situation in 
Hungary must be understood in the broader context 
of household indebtedness on the peripheries of Euro-
pe. Thus, we gathered with several engaged researchers 
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to bring together our knowledge and experience. We will 
make direct reference to the presentations given at this 
workshop and include the program of the workshop at 
the end of the booklet. 
In the early 2000s, the peripheries of Europe experienced 
a boom in household lending. This was integrated 
in a broader, global period of increased lending to 
households, but in places with little previous household 
lending, it caused important economic and societal 
changes. In Eastern European countries this process was 
further deepened by their accession to the EU, which 
happened during the very same years. This combination 
meant that these countries experienced a phase of ra-
pid liberalization parallel with quickly increasing levels 
of household debt – particularly housing-related debt. In 
terms of context, it is important that housing finance is 
generally much more volatile on the peripheries of Euro-
pe than in its core – the credit boom of the 2000s was a 
phase of expansion, to be followed by a rapid downturn 
after the crisis. Beyond mortgages, general investment 
in the housing market of European peripheries shows 
an even stronger exposure to crisis (see Fig. 1)1. As a 
result of the volatility of available finance, the housing 
markets of peripheral European countries are also 
instable (Bohle, 2018).
The boom of household debt led to a large bust in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Although excessive 
household lending is understood to generally precede 
crises, in the European context this boom–and–bust 
pattern was particularly true for peripheral countries. 
1 We have grouped European countries in the following way (the 
same grouping applies to all charts where the data is displayed 
in such a way): “Western Europe”: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden; “South-
ern Europe and Ireland”: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Spain; “Central and Eastern Europe”: Bulgaria, Czechia, 
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The financial and banking crisis of the core led to the 
abrupt halt of new capital investment on the peripheries 
of Europe (in various sectors of the economy), causing 
a strong recession. However, following the immediate 
impact of the financial crisis, “a new stage of deepening 
crisis started for the periphery of the eurozone in the 
beginning of 2010” due to the crisis management of 
European institutions and financial markets (Becker, 
Jäger and Weissenbacher, 2015, p. 89). “The so-called 
anti-crisis management was aimed at restoring pre-
crisis structures” (ibid, p. 89). This also meant that after 
2008 the mainstream European paradigm for crisis ma-
nagement was first to implement austerity measures 
(as a way to counter public debt), and then to rebuild 
household debt as one of the “engines of growth”. As 
a result, public policies fueled a new wave of household 
lending. 
However, with this new wave of household lending since 
2015, the structure of lending has changed. Mortgages 
(housing loans) – which were at the heart of the crisis in 
2008 – have been regulated more strictly, and as a result, 
they have been targeted at middle-class households with 
stable and higher income. On the other hand, the volume 
of newly issued consumer loans and personal loans 
increased, as lower-income households took on more of 
this kind of credit. This is because consumer loans are 
usually easier to access and have lower requirements 
than mortgages. Thus, households who cannot access 
































Southern Europe + Ireland
Figure 1. Real gross fixed 
investment in housing, annual 
percentage change. Source: EMF 
2019.
With the new wave of 
household lending since 
2015, the structure of 
lending has changed.
After 2008 the 
mainstream European 
paradigm for crisis 
management was first 
to implement austerity 
measures, and then to 
rebuild household debt.
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loan as a way of covering different housing-related 
costs. This, however, comes at a price: these forms of 
credit are generally more expensive and riskier than a 
mortgage.
Another form of household indebtedness is debt which 
accumulates as a result of arrears in utility bills and in 
other service bills. This is not part of public discourse as 
much as loans are, while it mostly affects lower-income 
households. Arrears in utilities are a huge problem on 
the peripheries of Europe, where energy prices are often 
relatively high.
In the publication, we draw attention to the role of 
corporate actors on the interface between households 
and financial markets. These corporate actors are often 
banks involved in household lending, but can also be a 
number of other types of companies: various financial 
enterprises, such as rapid credit providers or debt 
collectors. The Eastern enlargement of the EU in the 
mid-2000s was an important turning point for these 
companies in opening towards new peripheral markets. 
As a result, the market strategies of these large Euro-
pean (or sometimes global) companies have been very 
influential in how household debt in peripheral Europe 
has developed (Pósfai, 2018). 
The role of the state often appears rather as a lacking 
actor: instead of state programs to prevent households’ 
over-indebtedness and to help them out of a debt trap, 
public policies often enhance further indebtedness 
through liberal housing policies or through the lack of 
providing adequate public services. Policies of financial 
inclusion (that is, to propose solving households’ 
everyday needs by more access to credit) have proven 
to be controversial and inefficient in fighting against 
poverty (UN Human Rights Council, 2020). 
In the publication, we cover all different kinds of 
household debt: housing loans (mortgages), non-
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housing loans (consumer loans), utility and service bill 
arrears, and indebtedness through informal sources 
of loans as well. We discuss how debt is accumulated, 
what effect this has on households, as well as the 
institutional changes of the past decade concerning 
the debt of households on European peripheries. 
We also give short summaries of the presentations 
discussed at the workshop in Budapest at the end of 
November 2019. These appear in text boxes in the 
chapters.
We believe it is important to discuss the debt of 
households for various reasons. On the one hand, 
household debt plays a crucial role in the contemporary 
capitalist economy, and on the other hand, it also 
has severe consequences on households’ livelihood, 
employment possibilities, residential mobility, and 
on processes of impoverishment. Debt acts in many 
cases as the interface between financial markets and 
households, hence it is crucial to understand how the 
logic of finance trickles down to the level of households. 
Despite its relevance, debt often remains an invisible 
problem, pushed to the realms of individual responsibility. 
Following this approach leads to the neglect of structural 
aspects behind the accumulation of debt: namely the 
fact that the increasing financialization of the economy, 
the devaluation of labor and the failure of the state 
to provide basic services has been a combination 
that left few other options available to low-income 
households than to indebt themselves. Increasingly 
complicated financial instruments, like foreign currency-
denominated or indexed mortgages, were also used to 
shift new kinds of risk from financial institutions and 
the state onto households asked to “cope.” Recognizing 
these structural constraints is important in shift-
ing the discourse around debt away from a narrative 
of “blaming the poor”. This is an objective that we as 
critically engaged social scientists put forward in this 
publication. 
Debt acts in many cases 
as the interface between 
financial markets and 
households. Despite its 
relevance, debt often 
remains an invisible 
problem, pushed to the 
realms of individual 
responsibility.
Recognizing structural 
constraints is important 
in shifting the discourse 
around debt away from 
a narrative of “blaming 
the poor”.
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In the first section, we give reflections on the broader 
economic context of household debt, then in the 
second section, we outline institutional and regulatory 
frameworks related to household lending in place before 
and after the 2008 crisis. In the third section, we discuss 
different forms of non-mortgage debt, and in the fourth, 
we analyze what consequences indebtedness has in 
terms of housing possibilities: both from a structural 
and from an individual point of view. Finally, in the fifth 
section, we discuss the potential political responses.

1
Relations of dependency in Europe
Eastern and Southern Europe have always been 
dependent on the economic core of Europe: for 
technology and capital (Arrighi, 1990). At the same 
time, this part of Europe has provided cheap labor for 
capitalist production. As Weissenbacher argues, this 
unequal relation has been at the heart of the whole 
process of European integration; it is inherent to how 
the European Union works. The structure of how the 
EU is organized “seems to be […] the reason behind 
continuing difficulty of peripheral countries and 
regions” (Weissenbacher, 2019, p. 10). The mechanisms 
of EU crisis management in the late 1970s had already 
followed this structure. Neoliberal policies rolling out as 
a response to the crisis of the 1970s set austerity and 
liberalization as a prerequisite for Southern European 
countries to join the EU in the early 1980s. Furthermore, 
the role of these new coming countries in the common 
European economic space would be seen as absorbers of 
the surplus capital and the exported products of Europe-
an core countries (specifically of Germany, which had the 
largest economic weight from the beginning). This led to 
a situation where Southern countries would take on debt 
to pay for the products and technology exported by Wes-
tern European countries – thus solving two “problems” 
of the economic core at once: that of surplus capital and 
THE FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING 
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of limited market capacities (Weissenbacher, 2019). A 
similar pattern was repeated when Eastern European 
countries started their process of EU integration – first 
economically in the 1990s (through the privatization 
of large companies in key sectors of the economy and 
through foreign direct investment), then politically in 
the early 2000s. 
The role of European peripheries as absorbers of 
surplus capital could be further expanded by large-
scale household lending from the 2000s onwards. This 
is a market that can easily be expanded (especially in 
countries with relatively low levels of debt penetration), 
and which is also politically supported by almost all 
governments, due to the political attractiveness of 
supporting home acquisition and more consumption 
without significant fiscal input from the government. 
As financial markets were liberalized in CEE countries 
entering the EU, the role of debt became more and more 
important in European relations of dependency (Bec-
ker, Jäger and Weissenbacher, 2015). After the crisis of 
2008, this debt-dependency was translated into large-
scale austerity programs and dept-trapped households 
in various countries of the European periphery. 
Thus, dependent economic relations are inherent to how 
the EU is constructed and have been with us from the 
beginning of European integration (and also before). 
What is more recent is how household debt also comes 
to play a role in these relations of dependency. Debt 
opens a channel for households to act both as absorbers 
of surplus capital, and as a market for products exported 
from the core.
Theoretical reflections on the nature of dependency 
[Johannes Jäger]
Rent theory can be a relevant frame for explaining 
how different regimes of dependency led to various 
outcomes in terms of accumulation and extraction. 
As Johannes Jäger argues, dependent financialization 
The role of European 
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large-scale household 
lending from the 2000s 
onwards.
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is what puts specifically large emphasis on the real 
estate market and on financial extraction through 
rent (Becker, Jäger and Weissenbacher, 2015). This 
process leads to the increased commodification 
of housing and more household debt. Dependent 
industrialization, on the other hand, puts more 
emphasis on available cheap labor and favorable 
investment conditions in manufacturing facilities; in 
order to support export-oriented industries. 
These different channels of extraction result in 
different kinds of institutional setups and regulations. 
The beneficiaries of these different regimes of 
dependency can also be different, depending on 
ownership structures and on how value transfers are 
organized. Periods of dependent financialization and 
dependent industrialization can alternate in time, but 
as we see in the history and economic structure of the 
European Union, they are strongly interlinked and can 
happen simultaneously. The dependent position of a 
country is not always reflected in the same way in all 
sectors of the economy. That is, it can happen that 
in its manufacturing sectors a country is integrated 
in a structure of dependent industrialization, while 
its real estate or banking sector is structured by 
patterns of dependent financialization. Relations of 
dependency will not be equally strong in each sector 
in a given period. It is also important to take note of 
how the circle of beneficiaries changes in the case 
of reducing external dependency in a given economic 
sector. It often happens that in these cases the new 
beneficiaries are members of a domestic economic 
elite. 
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The variegated financialization of 
housing
As argued by the literature on variegated forms of 
housing financialization2; the specific forms that the 
financialization of housing will take differ from context 
to context (Aalbers, 2017). Housing financialization is 
driven by surplus capital from financial markets be-
ing invested in the housing market. However, the ways 
in which it is possible to invest will largely depend on 
the institutional landscape and ownership structure 
of a particular housing market (see Fig. 2). In housing 
markets dominated by homeownership (which is the 
case in countries of Southern and Eastern Europe), 
individual household debt will be an important channel 
for housing financialization. Thus, the market pressures 
of abundant capital will go towards the distribution of 
more and more loans to households for home acquisition. 
2 This term can be understood as a process (which cyclically reap-
pears in history) where the financial logic becomes increasingly de-
terminant in how housing is produced and how it can be accessed, 
and an increasing amount of money is invested in the housing 
market. For more details see for example the brochure of the Eu-
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Since homeownership is the dominant form of housing in 
most countries, mortgage lending to households will have 
a similar role in many places. Housing finance has been 
liberalized for a longer period of time in Western Europe 
or in the United States, thus the stock of outstanding 
household loans is much higher in these places than 
in Southern or Eastern European countries. In spite of 
this relatively lower volume of the stock of loans, what 
tends to make household lending in peripheral countries 
of Europe problematic, is the structure of the loans. 
Loans are given with higher, and often variable interest 
rates, which makes them more expensive and riskier 
(see Fig. 3). Thus, even though interest rates have been 
generally declining over the past decades, households 
in peripheral countries will only access more expensive 
credit. Conditions are worse because international 
financial companies have higher expectations of yields 
in peripheral than in core economies, and because the 
perceived risk here is higher. As a result, those that are 
systematically in a worse position can only get money on 
worse terms and thus end up paying more in return. This 
is one aspect of how loans systematically contribute to 
widening inequalities (Mian and Sufi, 2015). 
A further specificity of lending on the peripheries is that 
the availability of capital is very volatile. This means 
that in boom periods capital is abundant and then when 
a crisis hits, lending channels towards debtors perceived 
Figure 3. Interest rates on 
new residential loans, annual 
average based on monthly 
figures, percent. Source: EMF 
2019.
Those that are 
systematically in a worse 
position can only get 
money on worse terms.
Western Europe
Eastern Europe



























16 The financialization of housing 
as riskier are closed as financial institutions become very 
risk-averse (Pósfai, 2018). Freezing credit channels are 
also linked to the fact that the employment and income 
of households is much less stable in a peripheral economy, 
and unemployment levels will likely climb as a result of 
crisis. This highlights a further structural constraint of 
household lending on the peripheries: households often 
take on a loan to cover for costs of living or the provision 
of basic services (such as housing). However, due to 
precarious working conditions, they usually cannot 
expect to have stably improving wage conditions over 
time. Thus, repaying a loan will not become easier in the 
future, and if an economic crisis or a difficult life event 
hits, these households can easily experience difficulties 
in paying their loans. This can lead to a debt trap, and 
to repaying one loan by taking another – which opens a 
spiral of indebtedness. 
Mortgage lending as a form of investing surplus 
capital [Zsuzsanna Pósfai]
An important aspect of the financialization of 
housing is how the debt of households becomes a 
channel for investing surplus capital accumulating in 
financial markets and on the accounts of financial 
institutions. Housing markets (that is, new mortgage 
lending) in peripheral countries can be important 
in this process because there is a relatively lower 
level of debt penetration – that is, compared to 
core economies, fewer households have mortgages. 
Thus, it is a typical pattern that capital from core 
economies is invested in the housing markets of 
peripheral countries (Pósfai, 2018). A very clear-cut 
example of this was the spread of forex mortgages 
(loans denominated in foreign currencies) in some 
Eastern European countries in the years preceding 
the 2008 crisis. Hungary experienced one of the most 
devastating shocks relating to forex loans when the 
Hungarian currency plummeted during the crisis. 
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This led to rapidly increasing monthly installments 
for households, who were anyway experiencing 
economic hardships (Bohle, 2018).
This aspect is important to highlight because the 
discourse on household debt usually focuses on the 
demand side (why do people take credit, do they 
take too much, etc.), and the supply side remains 
invisible. However, household lending systematically 
increases in periods of capital abundance – thus, 
it is more dependent on supply-side pressures and 
macroeconomic processes than on the demand of 
households. In such periods of capital abundance 
households are often incentivized by various 
measures to take loans. Banks deliberately push 
for credit expansion, relaxing lending standards to 
capture as much of the market as possible (the wave 
of forex lending in the 2000s was a major example for 
such a period). Governments play an important role 
in this through policies supporting homeownership 
or subsidizing loans. Credit-based housing solutions 
are convenient for governments, because they do not 
need to maintain institutions of housing provision, 
and because more lending generates economic 
growth on a macro scale. 
The specific institutions that channel money into 
the housing market change in time and depending 
on context. Before the 2008 crisis, the main channel 
for investing in the housing markets of Europe-
an peripheries was through mortgages. After the 
crisis, this channel became narrower, and new ones 
developed; such as the sector of institutionally owned 
rental housing in Southern Europe, set up through 
the large scale buy-up of defaulting previously 
mortgaged properties. 
After the 2008 crisis, on the European peripheries 
mortgage lending criteria generally became stricter, 
which was important in order to avoid personal 
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bankruptcies due to housing loans such as those 
that occurred before. However, since housing 
systems did not shift away from the dominance of 
homeownership and housing costs were generally 
on the rise since 2014; this led to other forms of 
loans becoming more important in financing housing 
costs. These are various forms of non-collateralized 
loans (such as personal loans, credit card debt or cre-
dit overdraft).
The housing markets of Southern and Eastern Euro-
pean countries show certain structural similarities 
rooted in their dependent position. To start with, 
they have a housing market based predominantly on 
homeownership, which has in past decades become the 
near-only way to secure one’s housing and is also the only 
tenure form actively supported by public policies. The 
dominance of homeownership was strengthened by the 
dismantlement of the social housing stock (in Eastern 
Europe very quickly after the political and economic 
transformations of 1989; in Southern Europe a bit more 
gradually since the 1980s). What is left was usually 
transferred to local municipalities, who thus receive the 
task of managing the impoverishment of tenants and a 
deteriorating social housing stock with little resources. 
As a result, most new entrants to the housing market 
(except the highest status social groups) have no other 
option than to get indebted in order to buy property. 
New entrants to the housing market are often young 
households: the generational inequality is thus also 
reinforced. This is particularly the case in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, where the extensive and fast housing 
privatization of the early 1990s meant relatively 
cheaper access to housing for many members of older 
generations. In the case of those currently securing 
their housing, this discrepancy between income / savings 
levels and house prices often leads to over-indebtedness 
and debt default. 
Most new entrants to 
the housing market 
(except the highest 
status social groups) 
have no other option 
than to get indebted in 
order to buy property.
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High and rapidly increasing housing costs have also led 
to a rise in consumer credit, particularly among social 
groups who cannot (or not easily) access mortgages. 
These forms of credit are typically more expensive, and 
thus also carry more risk of a debt trap. 
Non-bank financial institutions have also been emerging 
as important actors of the lending landscape to lower-
income households. These financial corporations usually 
have more flexible lending policies than banks, and also 
include more households with their doorstep agent 
practices or very quick credit decisions. Another type of 
financial corporation which is active in managing the 
debt of households are debt collector companies, buying 
non-performing loans (and unpaid arrears) from banks 
and service providers. They are important elements of 
housing financialization, and have a marked European-
scale strategy, according to which previous spaces of 
financial overinclusion become good markets. 
Altogether, how is broader economic dependency 
important in how housing markets develop on the 
peripheries? In the following points we summarize the 
main aspects: 
 ▪ High volatility of available capital: in expansion 
periods capital floods these markets, while in case 
of a crisis, it is abruptly withdrawn. This causes 
volatility on the housing market as well: house prices 
and transaction numbers increase quickly (fueled 
by new household lending) in periods of economic 
growth, and they drop suddenly when a crisis hits. 
This is one of the ways peripheral housing markets 
are drawn into how the economic core manages its 
crisis of overaccumulation. 
 ▪ There is a lack of long-term financial resources, which 
further contributes to housing market instability/ 
volatility.
Peripheral housing 
markets are drawn into 
how the economic core 
manages its crisis of 
overaccumulation.
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 ▪ On the scale of households, housing finance is 
only accessible with worse conditions than in core 
economies.
 ▪ There are no institutions for owning and managing 
rental housing (especially not affordable rental 
housing).
 ▪ Due to a lack of other stable long-term housing 
solutions, lower-income people also take mortgages, 
which can easily lead to default (especially since 
employment opportunities also tend to be more 
volatile). 
Households and the debt burden
It is important to note that not all segments of housing 
work according to the logic of finance (especially not 
in Eastern Europe). Many households secure their 
housing with the combination of family support 
(intergenerational transfers) and savings, they build 
with the help of relatives, they inherit an apartment, 
or they buy in very cheap locations. However, with 
rising housing costs, and with the inability to keep 
up with these costs, households will need to resort to 
financial institutions more often in order to secure 
their housing. This means that the logic of the financial 
sector is increasingly integrated into the everyday lives 
of households. 
To understand how households are affected by these 
processes, it is important to examine the instances of 
securing a home. That is, when households move, when 
they need to access a new place to live. This is the point 
where the problematic points of the housing market 
can easily be identified. Shifts in housing finance and 
in housing-related institutions can significantly change 
how housing can be accessed. These changes are crucial 
for households who are moving apart, who need to 
change their place of residence, or for newly established 
With rising housing 
costs, and with the 
inability to keep up with 
these costs, households 
will need to resort to 
financial institutions 
more often. The logic of 
the financial sector is 
increasingly integrated 
into the everyday lives 
of households.
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young households. Additionally, shifts in housing finance 
and housing-related institutions are also the points 
where investors or new organizations can enter the 
sector; setting the ground for further changes. 
Increasing house prices, higher debt burden, and 
the role of the state – a focus on Portugal [Eugé-
nia Pires]
The increase of house prices is an overall tendency 
in Europe for the past decades, but accelerated in 
the early 2000s; to continue after a brief downturn 
following the crisis of 2008. In order to cope with 
these higher prices (both for buying and for rental), 
households have been taking on a debt burden 
beyond acceptable levels, increasingly relying on 
multiple sources of non-mortgage credit. On the 
other hand, in a context of reduced provision of 
social housing and promotion of homeownership, 
there is also the supply-side factor discussed in the 
previous section: financialization profits out of the 
extraordinary liquidity created, and not mopped up, 
by central banks in the context of the financial crisis 
of 2008, and EU sovereign debt crisis, fosters this 
vicious cycle where more available capital pushes 
more lending, and this increased amount of capital 
in turn, pushes house prices up. 
As a result, both house prices and household debt 
levels have significantly increased in Europe over the 
past 20-30 years. Looking at the most recent surge in 
house prices, between 2013 and 2019, Hungary had 
the highest increase of 77 p.p., while Portugal was 
the fourth with a 49 p.p. increase. Other countries 
of the European periphery also experienced strong 
increases in their house prices. 
High housing prices represent an important burden 
on households’ budget and lead to the displacement 
of the city center residents and spatial segregation. 
Because of housing-related debt taken on, in spite of 
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relatively low or unstable income, an increasing debt 
delinquency can be observed in certain countries. It 
is also important that most defaulters accumulate 
several credits of different types, which makes their 
total debt burden very high compared to their income. 
Among those contacting a consumer protection 
agency in Portugal in the first half of 2019, the 
average debt burden ratio compared to their income 
was 73%. Although first-residence mortgages are 
the main credit, consumer loans taken to help make 
ends meet (after having paid for housing costs) also 
contribute to this high debt burden. The fear of asset 
garnishment and foreclosure, unemployment, low 
wages and precarious labor relations feeds into this 
debt trap. 
In Portugal, the interlinkage between increasing 
housing costs and indebtedness is closely intertwined 
and deepened through different processes. From 
a structural point of view, liberal housing policies 
favoring homeownership, European-scale austerity 
policies imposed by the Troika, as well as the principle 
of free circulation of capital in Europe all lead to 
Figure 4. House price evolution 
in different European countries 
between 2013 and 2019, 
2015=100. Source: Eurostat 
House price index.
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difficulties of housing affordability. More debt is 
a common consequence of this. On the scale of 
individual investors, house prices have been pushed 
up by individuals from Western Europe buying 
holiday homes and retirement homes, as well as 
by the golden visa programs. These tendencies are 
characteristic of several countries of the European 
periphery beyond Portugal as well. 
Nevertheless, some lessons can be taken. To begin 
with, until 2010, the housing market has been 
more or less protected from international investors 
and speculation, as they were only interested in 
offices, retail and logistics. The house-renting mar-
ket was not attractive because the legal framework 
was tailored to protect long-term tenants. On the 
other hand, the banking system acted as a cushion 
pad with foreclosures seldom happening, and 
only as a last resort measure. However, the troika 
bailout created, both by international pressure and 
ideological identification of the government, the 
state of exception to implement the missing policy 
measures underpinning the Washington consensus 
menu. Labor markets were liberalized, generating 
the intended nominal adjustment through wage 
compression and precarization of labor relations; the 
house renting market was also reformed, in spite 
of fostering tenants’ exposure to continued rental 
renovation and rising prices; and banks’ balance 
sheet cleared of non-performing loans. 
Besides the heavy burden on workers and households, 
this created the new regulatory framework promoter 
of the new model of development, based on the 
attraction of capital inflows eager of short-term pro-
fiting both by low-cost airlines, global tourism opera-
tors, and aggressive investment funds. In this context, 
tourism and real-estate were up-graded to tradable 
assets and subject to external demand. Indeed, 
tourism related activities are the main component 
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of exports, representing a share of almost 20%, and 
its external component contributing to almost 9% of 
GDP. With the exposure to external demand of these 
important economic segments comes, not only the 
speculative bubble on real-estate and the erosion 
of housing stock, with heavy social costs borne by 
residents, but above all, accrued volatility and a new 
source of external macro-economic imbalances. In 
the absence of capital controls, the country becomes 
subject to sudden stops and capital runs, reinforcing 
its semi-peripheric condition.
Since the crisis of 2008, house prices have been on 
the rise all over Europe, but they have been rising at 
a faster pace on the peripheries of Europe (see Fig. 5). 
These rising house prices have led to an increasing debt 
burden. The social costs of this debt burden and of the 
difficulties to access housing are borne by the residents. 
In this, broader family resources are drawn into the 
financialization logic. There are various ways of how this 
happens. In case of difficulties of payment with a loan, it 
is common for family resources to be mobilized in order 
to not lose the home and pay the debt. Thus in the end, 
even more family resources go towards the financial 
institution. A variation of this is when a family member 
resorts to international migration in order to have an 
employment opportunity with which they can support 
Figure 5. Change in nominal 
house price, annual percentage 






























Southern Europe + Ireland
their family in repaying their debts. This was a quite 
common strategy of Hungarians after the 2008 crisis. 
When a crisis hits, households typically move away from 
formal market solutions for securing their housing. 
They look for cheap, sometimes informal or semi-formal 
housing solutions, and start relying more on broader 
family networks (Gagyi and Vigvári, 2018). This can be 
seen as a process of de-financialization, but often does 
not result in securing adequate housing. Also, these 
strategies cannot be understood independently from 
housing financialization, since they are a reaction given 
to the consequences of an increasing financial logic in 
the domain of housing. 
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This section aims to highlight the institutional changes 
related to household lending on the peripheries of Euro-
pe in the decade before and after the financial crisis of 
2008. The crisis was an important turning point in many 
ways. From about 2000 onwards, the Eastern periphery 
of Europe was quickly integrated into a European-wide 
regime of increasing household debt, as in the South it 
had already happened earlier. This primarily happened 
through banks in Western ownership. Following the 
crisis, this structure of housing finance was questioned 
– in some countries more extensively than others. As a 
result, there were important institutional shifts in the 
ways in which governments steered access to housing 
and household consumption in general, but also how 
financial institutions navigated the post-crisis market.
High homeownership rates have been a prevalent form 
of housing in most peripheral states. Parallel to that, 
since the 1990s, the advancing EU principle of the free 
movement of capital, and the concomitant expansion 
of financial services shaped Europe’s East and So-
uth. Domestic banks’ reliance on foreign investment, 
the appearance of foreign financial institutions, and 
the presence of international institutions all played 
an important role in the financialization of housing 
on the peripheries of Europe. In 2008, the crisis visibly 
hit the peripheral economies stronger than the core. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN 
HOUSEHOLD LENDING: TRAJECTORIES 
OF THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY 
In 2008, the crisis 
visibly hit the peripheral 
economies stronger than 
the core.
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Withdrawing international capital, the consequent 
loss of jobs and grievances around foreclosures and 
evictions, as well as the recollection of outstanding 
debts showed the far-reaching social consequences of 
pre-crisis overinclusive lending to households. Parallel to 
this, the revival of EU economies (especially those within 
the eurozone) was supported by different measures 
increasing financial liquidity. Most importantly, the 
program of quantitative easing (QE)3 introduced by 
the European Central Bank as a response to the post-
crisis recession. As a result, a new pressure built up on 
financial markets for investing more money. In terms 
of household lending, this led to domestic policies 
and institutional reorganizations in various European 
countries facilitating a new rollout of credit (see Fig. 64).
3 This program meant spending 2,6 trillion euros on buying the debt 
of European governments and corporations, as well as securities 
and bonds between 2015 and 2018. This flood of money was cou-
pled with historically low interest rates. That is, keeping the costs 
of borrowing low and disincentivizing savings while channeling 
available money into investments. A new wave of QE is being in-
troduced by the ECB in 2020 in response to the recession-induced 
by the COVID-19 outbreak.
4 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-ecb-qe/the-life-and-
times-of-ecb-quantitative-easing-2015-18-idUSKBN1OB1SM.
Figure 6. Lending gets boost 
from quantitative easing. 
Loans to households. Source: 
own editing based on Reuters 
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The drivers of the pre-crisis debt 
boom 
The first driver of the debt boom before the 2008 
crisis was the facilitation of high homeownership rates 
through state policies. Most European states started to 
privatize public housing in the 1980s and offered various 
kinds of tax reliefs for taking mortgages, targeting first 
buyers, and providing other subsidies to foster private 
homeownership (Bohle and Greskovits, 2015). The turn to 
neoliberal policies intersected with the democratization 
of peripheral European countries, such as Spain and 
Portugal, but also served as the powerful alternative 
to the failed state socialist regimes of Eastern Euro-
pe. As part of the neoliberal turn, the shaping of urban 
policies has been increasingly reliant on the footloose 
nature of capital. Former urban politics of redistribution 
and service provision have been gradually replaced by 
new measures seeking competitiveness and economic 
development. While housing policies clearly differ across 
Southern and Eastern European countries, there are 
common peripheral traits.
Peripheral states also chose not to build up (or 
maintain) capacities to manage a big rental sector, 
rather, even flats built during the post-war decades 
were eventually sold to tenants. Self-help construction 
after World War II was common in Southern Europe-
an (and Eastern) states, governments even promoted 
these as solutions to amend the lack of state capacities. 
It is important to note that even during state socialism 
in Eastern European countries, the majority of homes 
were in private ownership, and other forms of semi-
private and corporate ownership were also common. 
This is mainly due to a lack of state resources to provide 
a sufficient amount of housing. Self-help construction 
and individual involvement in financing housing were 
supported by Eastern European socialist states from the 
late 1970s / early 1980s onwards, and mechanisms for 
The first driver of the 
debt boom before the 
2008 crisis was the 
facilitation of high 
homeownership rates 
through state policies.
Peripheral states also 
chose not to build up 
(or maintain) capacities 
to manage a big rental 
sector, rather, even flats 
built during the post-war 
decades were eventually 
sold to tenants.
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state-subsidized housing credit also became popular in 
the 1980s. However, the final push for housing sectors 
based almost exclusively on individual ownership was 
the privatization process connected to the political and 
economic transformation of 1989-1990.
Public housing was transferred to private hands, as one 
of the first steps of the newly democratic states. The 
most common practice was to sell the housing units 
at a relatively low price to sitting tenants. Promoting 
homeownership instead of maintaining a wide rental 
sector was also a way to create political support; 
privatization representing an important transfer of 
wealth from the state to households. The process 
had a wide legitimation, as the post-socialist heritage 
included the condemnation of the state as a landlord, 
validating private ownership as the right solution, along 
with the then and now globally hegemonic ideology of 
homeownership (Ronald, 2008). Furthermore, it helped 
local governments to ease the burden of financial 
constraints to manage a large housing stock during the 
turbulent transition period. 
Accessing ownership was possible without a large 
mortgage debt in the late 1980s and early 1990s, due 
to privatization at prices far below market value. The 
increase in homeownership was also connected to the 
increase of private rental prices, incentivizing people 
to rather apply for bank credits to purchase their 
homes. A variation of privatization has been using legal 
procedures of transitional justice to transfer (“restitute” 
or “reprivatize”) what used to be social housing to heirs 
of pre-war landlords, alongside speculators often using 
questionable property titles in a process of post-socialist 
primitive accumulation by dispossession (Kusiak, 2019).
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As a result of these processes, homeownership rates 
are very high in Eastern European countries, and also 
relatively high in Southern Europe (see Fig. 75).
The second driver of the debt boom relates to the 
widespread appearance of housing mortgages. Both in 
the East and South, homeownership had been initially 
achieved by a low involvement of mortgages. This 
started to change from the 1990s onwards, taking 
a more dramatic turn during the 2000s. In Southern 
Europe, with the extension of credit opportunities, 
a tenure shift took place from non-mortgage to 
increasingly mortgaged homeownership, meanwhile, 
high homeownership rates have been sustained in 
comparison to rental. In some Eastern European 
countries, the 2000s were characterized by the rapid 
growth of forex loans (loans denominated in foreign 
currencies), providing lower interest rates than loans 
denominated in national currencies. As a result, there 
was a sudden growth of household debt, and forex 
mortgages started to dominate household mortgages 
in a mere few years, in opposition to Southern Euro-
pe that had a longer experience with mortgages – and 
thus, overall higher ratios of residential loans-to-GDP 
(see Fig 8). Along with this rapid market expansion and 
5 Grouping does not include data on Cyprus, Malta (Southern Eu-
rope) and Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania (Eastern Europe).
Figure 7. Share of households 
in different tenure types, 2016 
or latest year available. Source: 
OECD.
Owner with mortgage Other, unknown
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continuously relaxing lending criteria, lower-income 
households also had the opportunity to use mortgages 
to finance their housing. Parallel to that, states started 
to rely even more heavily on market mechanisms to 
secure housing for their citizens, and as a result, social 
programs in housing took the back seat.
While mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratios show an increase 
during the late 2000s in all peripheral states, in general, 
Southern Europe (with an exception of Italy) had a much 
higher percentage of mortgage products compared to 
Eastern European states, with Spain leading the way. 
However, it is important to consider the tendency 
of rapidly growing mortgage debt, which puts both 
households and the institutions of housing finance under 
strain. This jump in newly issued mortgages proved to 
be unsustainable when the crisis hit. Thus, debt-to-GDP 
levels started to fall in most countries after 2008 (see 
Fig. 8).
Characteristics of the pre-crisis debt boom in 
Croatia [Marek Mikuš]
After the declaration of independence from 
Yugoslavia in 1991, the government of Croatia 
in 1993 tamed hyperinflation by a stabilization 
program that was based on pegging the kuna to 
Deutschmark, and later to the Euro. This has become 
a permanent disinflation tool with which the central 
Figure 8. Ratio of total 
outstanding residential loans to 
GDP, selected countries, 2001-
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bank guarantees price stability. However, this po-
licy has also shaped the peripheral financialization 
of Croatia as it created an attractive environment 
for large cross-border capital inflows during the 
2000s. The following prerequisites for these inflows 
had been gradually put in place since the mid-
1990s: external financial liberalization through lift-
ing limits on capital imports; internal liberalization 
through reducing central bank reserve requirements; 
and the dominant takeover of Croatian banks by 
Austrian, Italian and other Western European banks 
(Mikuš, 2019b). Benefitting from cross-border in-
terest rate differentials, banks imported large 
quantities of capital, which have been channeled 
mainly into household lending. A major part of the 
debt boom was Swiss franc lending that enabled 
banks to make their credit more competitive and 
expand market shares while transferring exchange 
rate risks onto households. For banks, the main 
drivers of the debt boom was the high profitability 
of the Croatian household credit market (Mikuš, 
2019a). The incentives for households included a 
lack of alternatives to homeownership, increasingly 
unaffordable housing prices, and relevant social 
norms, in particular an association between 
homeownership and socially validated adulthood. 
The ongoing debt and housing boom generated peer 
pressure and a fear of missing the opportunity to 
become a homeowner, which fueled the process even 
more. Other enabling conditions included government 
policies supporting mortgaging and optimism about 
future prosperity in the context of the ongoing EU 
integration and internationalization.
Third, international institutions played a crucial role 
in the generation of a Europe-wide debt boom. Paral-
lel to the development of the EU, the creation of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) has also added to the 
integration of capital markets and the banking sector. 
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With growing competition, transnational mergers and 
acquisitions, banks were more prone to borrow money 
from international markets, increasing the overall debt. 
Furthermore, mortgage lending – being the core of 
neoliberal housing policies – was deregulated and had 
exploded in the 2000s, even if the levels of deregulation 
differ significantly across Europe. 
The EU has provided several incentives throughout the 
last decades for the liberalization of financial markets, 
while the eurozone nurtured the flow of foreign capital 
into mortgage markets in peripheral eurozone countries. 
The EU initiated the integration of residential mortgage 
markets in 2003 “to enable EU consumers to maximize 
their ability to tap into their housing assets, where 
appropriate, to facilitate future long-term security in 
the face of an increasingly aging population” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005, p. 3). Member states actively 
supported the spread of mortgages through public 
subsidies and the promotion of the homeownership 
model. Since 2007 the European Commission aimed 
to further reduce barriers and costs for engaging in 
cross-border activities, as “[m]ortgage credit markets 
represent a significant part of Europe’s economy, with 
outstanding residential mortgage credit balances 
representing almost 47% of the EU GDP” (European 
Commission, 2007).
The effects of the 2008 financial and 
economic crisis 
The crisis hit the peripheral economies of Europe 
strongly, which became visible through failing market 
mechanisms and through the consequent grievances 
around foreclosures and evictions.
The failing of market mechanisms stems from three 
interrelated domains and their variegated effect in 
Third, international 
institutions played 
a crucial role in the 
generation of a Europe-
wide debt boom.
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particular combinations: the banking system, the real-
estate sector, and public-private debt (see Hadjimichalis 
and Hudson, 2014). In the outburst of the crisis, Europe’s 
peripheries experienced a sudden stop and reversal of 
financial investment, which was reverted towards 
markets deemed to be safer havens for investment. In 
the real estate sector, this reversal of investments led 
to the failure of the construction sector. The previously 
developed high dependence on foreign credit (both public 
and private) also quickly became problematic as states, 
companies and households experienced difficulties of 
payment, and were brought into an even more difficult 
situation in countries where the local currency lost a lot 
of its value. 
To stop the outflow of capital from the periphery back to 
the core, banks and states negotiated to maintain the 
presence of exposed banks, in order to put a halt on the 
loss of commitment of foreign banks. Such negotiation 
was the Vienna Initiative by the IMF and EBRD, which 
served to maintain the presence of exposed Austrian 
and Italian banks in Eastern Europe, preventing financial 
capital flight. The European Union, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund intervened 
with a concerted effort to provide liquidity through 
treaties on lending: the so-called Memorandums of 
Understanding. These agreements primarily focused on 
the rescue of banks and investors, by adapting various 
austerity measures to state spending, wages, pensions, 
and by applying several welfare cuts. Further, IMF stand-
by agreements over economic programs had been 
negotiated with Romania and Latvia to seek financial 
support, while in 2011 the EU introduced macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP) to overlook and correct 
macroeconomic developments.
The consequences of the crisis were devastating for 
most households in Southern and Eastern Europe, 
resulting in foreclosures and the increase of evicted 
households. Additionally, as a result of austerity 
In the outburst of 
the crisis, Europe’s 
peripheries experienced a 
sudden stop and reversal 
of financial investment, 
which was reverted 
towards markets deemed 
to be safer havens for 
investment.
The eurozone nurtured 
the flow of foreign 
capital into mortgage 
markets in peripheral 
eurozone countries.
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measures, households had to deal with cuts in wages, 
reduced social benefits and pensions, and increasing 
unemployment. Former loan repayments continued to 
run (when, for instance, the selling price of a house on 
an auction did not cover the previous sum of the loan), 
indebting households even more. The above processes 
led to an unprecedented increase in non-performing 
loans, not just on a household level, but also among 
small businesses, increasing the amount of outstanding 
debt.
Evictions as a form of dispossession have gradually 
increased in number after the outburst of the 2008 
crisis. As financial and real estate speculation had 
brought the economy to a meltdown, stalled spaces 
and unfinished sites became the center of attention 
of policymakers and politicians. The number of 
empty buildings and evictions was a vivid and much-
felt consequence of the financialization of housing. 
Foreclosures were widespread across cities, affecting 
both working- and middle-class citizens, due to the 
loose credit requirements in the pre-crisis years and 
the following post-crisis unemployment. The poor were 
increasingly driven out from the cities, accompanied by 
anger towards evictions and the corollaries of the crisis.
Over-indebtedness of households had a direct impact on 
the economic stability of the banking sector, providing 
justification for property seizure, through foreclosures 
and auctions. Thus, the concentration of properties in 
the hands of banks, investment funds and other non-
banking financial institutions has been overlooked by 
governments in order to be able to reconfigure the 
economy. 
Ownership by financial institutions was typical rather of 
Southern European countries, whereas in Eastern Euro-
pe there was rather a lack of institutions which would 
be willing to become property owners and managers. For 
instance, in Hungary, a more common strategy was to 
Foreclosures were 
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affecting both working- 
and middle-class 
citizens, due to the loose 
credit requirements in 
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unemployment.
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leave the debtor in their home but maintain pressure for 
the payment of the debt. When this was not successful, 
foreclosures and auctions did happen of course, but 
instead of large international financial actors, the 
buyers at these auctions would usually be smaller local 
entrepreneurs, often in some relation to the local bailiff. 
Foreclosures and the struggle against auctions in 
Greece [Sotiris Sideris]
Thousands of properties have gone under the 
hammer in Greece since May 2016, as a devastating 
consequence of the financial and economic crisis 
of 2008, and the inability of households and 
enterprises to pay off their outstanding debt. The 
circumstances that led to this result are rooted in 
the financialization of the economy, which started 
in Greece during the 1990s. Back then, the lack 
of social housing and economic insecurity was 
compensated by the antiparochi system6, which 
contributed to multiple property ownerships. These 
properties sometimes remained vacant in order to 
keep maintenance costs and tax contributions low. 
Without the presence of strong state intervention, 
housing was a form of security for safe investment 
and social mobility aspirations. This has gradually 
changed during the 2000s, and after joining the 
eurozone in 2001. Instead of investing in the real 
economy, banks started to put their money into 
financial assets. Through credit expansion, one 
channel for these financial assets became housing 
loans. Similar to other peripheral countries, lending 
became the norm for households to gain access to 
housing during the first decade of 2000. The burst 
of the speculative bubble of housing in 2008 caused 
6 Small landowners offered their plot of land (or obsolete buildings) 
for housing developers, and in exchange, the landowner became 
the owner of some of the built dwellings and the rest belonged to 
the small developer agency. Usually, these plots were rather small 
in size, not the typical large-scale developments.
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a severe limitation on saving capabilities and the 
increase of private debt, resulting in the rise of 
property prices and the number of vacant dwellings. 
Real estate during the crisis has been targeted by 
adjustment programs, while property taxes served 
to fill the hole of income for the state, putting great 
pressure on property owners. Auctions of private 
property have become a common tool to recapitalize 
the banking system and get rid of non-performing 
loans. Since 2014, the ban on foreclosures has been 
canceled, and the sale of foreclosed properties has 
been facilitated by launching an online auction plat-
form (eauction.gr). According to research made by 
AthensLive7, the first property appeared on the site 
on the 18th of November 2017, and as the 2019 Euro-
pean Commission Report for Greece mentions, the on-
line platform was first put into use as “an alternative 
for and [to] eventually replace the highly problematic 
and contested conduct of physical auctions. It has 
allowed for the resuming of liquidations of collateral 
after a long moratorium followed by a de facto 
blockage of physical auctions by activists throughout 
Greece.” The platform contains the documentation 
of more than 45-thousand unique online auctions, 
providing sensitive data on basic information such as 
the identity of debtors, their names and VAT number.
7 https://athenslive.gr/.
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Managing the post-crisis era: cleaning 
toxic portfolios for a new loan cycle
In order to clean banks’ debt portfolios, the EU, ECB, 
and IMF initiated various credit programs. In general, 
EU institutions encouraged the close collaboration 
of banks and governments to recapitalize the bank-
ing system. The so-called Troika institutions – the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – monitored 
countries in economic crisis and provided country-
specific suggestions for economic restructuring, which 
often meant the implementation of various austerity 
measures. 
After 2015, the European Central Bank provided 
incentives for domestic banks to clean their portfolios 
from non-performing loans (NPLs) through its asset 
purchase program (European Central Bank, 2015). The 
old NPLs were either accounted for as losses or were 
sold to debt collectors to make way for a new loan 
cycle. The ECB, without being elected democratically, 
dictates monetary policy for all EU countries and has 
also influenced policies concerning wage, labor and 
privatization policies.
Furthermore, in June 2018, the European Central Bank 
announced in the framework of the single supervisory 
mechanism (SSM) that the banks of the countries of 
the eurozone could not exceed 20% of NPLs by the year 
2021, being less than 10% in the following year of 2022. 
That being stated, for financial institutions two roads 
were possible: either continuing and increasing debt 
enforcement proceedings including foreclosures at the 
end of the process, or selling NPLs to various investment 
and vulture funds or debt collector companies (who then 
have the possibility of trying to collect the outstanding 
loan from the debtor). The role of the ECB sheds light on 
how these seemingly technocratic mechanisms actually 
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covered highly political decisions, cleaning up the toxic 
real estate assets of banks’ portfolios.
Debt collector companies8 have increased in number and 
have grown in size after these decisions, focusing on 
varying business models. The larger international ones 
(typically from wealthier EU countries) follow a Europe-
an strategy and operate mainly on European markets. 
Some examples of the largest European debt collectors 
are Swedish companies Intrum (European market leader 
since its merger with Norwegian Lindhoff in 2017) and 
Hoist9. One of the major actors focusing specifically on 
the Eastern European region is Czech company APS. 
Defaulting housing loans became a profitable mar-
ket to invest in, hence the debt collector market grew 
rapidly. Buying claims of mortgages also meant that 
these companies developed or expanded their branch 
of activities specialized in collecting collateralized 
debt (that is, debt secured by real estate). Previously, 
many had only dealt with company debt and non-
collateralized household debt (that is, bill arrears and 
smaller consumer loans). Thus, debt collection became 
a new form of investment in the housing markets of Eu-
ropean peripheries, and also of capital extraction from 
households. In addition to the original debt, penalty in-
terest rates and various charges could even multiply the 
original debt (Mikuš, forthcoming). Debt collectors could 
become key players in markets where formerly risky loans 
have been extensive. Therefore, debt collection focusing 
on household loans can be seen as more characteristic 
of peripheral Europe. Outside of Europe, the United 
States is a very big market of debt collection, and some 
Asian markets (such as Vietnam) are also starting to be 
penetrated by these global companies. Their practice is 
8 The basic business model of debt collector companies is to buy up 
outstanding debt from companies for a fraction of their worth 
and try to gain profit by enforcing the repayment of these loans.
9 https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-debtcollectors/debt-
collectors-make-europes-bad-loans-pay-again-idUKKBN1950G3.
Defaulting housing loans 
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controversial because, on the one hand, debt collectors 
can offer more room for negotiation to debtors, but on 
the other hand are more specialized and focused on 
extracting money from people that banks gave up on 
and passed to the debt collectors, which often speeds up 
the process of foreclosure. According to a recent report 
by Finance Watch, debt collection malpractices are 
widespread and violate the human dignity of debtors10. 
The cleaning of the debt portfolios has been followed 
by further difficulties in access to housing for citizens 
in two ways. First, the appearance of international 
investors and vulture funds on the housing market after 
the crisis (the most well-known, Blackstone, one of the 
world’s largest private equity funds) led to a new wave 
of speculative real estate development, where prices 
increased particularly for private rental housing. The 
formerly individually owned homes have been bought 
by these investors after their foreclosure and turned 
into rental properties. Second, after the clearing of toxic 
portfolios, a new round of – socially more selective – 
loans have been introduced to yet again deepen citizens’ 
reliance on debt.
Differences in the pre-crisis and post-crisis credit 
cycles in Hungary [Zita Fellner & Anna Marosi]
Before the crisis, several factors contributed to 
the build-up of vulnerable lending in Hungary. 
Overinclusive lending started from 2001 onwards 
when mortgage rate and interest rate subsidies led 
to excessive HUF credit-demand. After 2004, the HUF 
loan terms were tightened as state subsidies for this 
form of housing finance were stopped and intense 
demand was moving towards forex-based loans, 
which offered more favorable interest rates. As a 
result of heated bank competition for new markets, 
10 h t t p s : / / w w w. f i n a n c e - w a t c h . o rg / d e b t- c o l l e c t i o n - e u -
rope-could-end-unjustifiable-and-wide-spread-malpractices/.
The cleaning of the debt 
portfolios has been 
followed by further 
difficulties in access to 
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the terms of lending loosened and the share of less 
creditworthy customers increased over time, coupling 
with regulatory deficiencies: missing prudential and 
consumer protection measures, and “adjustable in-
terest rate” mortgages that allowed banks to make 
unilateral changes to their customers’ contractual 
interest rates subsequently. 
During the outburst of the crisis, forex loans showed 
the largest default ratio (especially home equity 
loans). Households’ repayment burdens increased 
as a result of the depreciating forint, but also due 
to “adjustable rates”: banks counterbalanced their 
higher losses by applying higher interest rates on 
household debt. As a consequence, regular monthly 
repayments increased significantly, by 50% to even 
80% in some cases.
In the new post-crisis cycle of loans after 2015, new 
certified housing loans became available, where 
fees applied before disbursement and prepayment 
fees have been capped, providing no hidden costs. 
A shorter deadline has been taken to evaluate the 
loan applications, moreover, interest rate fixation 
had to last at least 3 years, with a maturity of a 
maximum of 30 years. However, due to the debt 
cap macroprudential rules that aim to prevent 
overindebtedness, banks tend to apply rather strict 
scoring criteria, thus access to these safer loans is 
generally limited to households with higher income 
and long-term employment – which excludes many 
households.
New subsidies for home acquisition (the Home 
Purchase Subsidy; distributed according to the 
number of children a family has or promises to have in 
the future) and loans with state subsidies have been 
introduced (to go with the Home Purchase Subsidy, 
and the Prenatal baby support, which is basically a 
very large consumer loan with favorable conditions). 
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These instruments were intended to restart lending 
to households. In the beginning, wealthier customers 
entered these schemes, mainly for housing purposes, 
but loan refinancing and investment aims also pla-
yed part in taking these loans. Hence, housing loans 
still remained a privilege of upper-class citizens, 
thus the less well-off face unsatisfied loan demand. 
Due to the clearing of bank portfolios, lower-income 
households remained indebted not to banks, but to 
debt collector companies instead, which also meant 
that there was a loss of information on how these 
households managed their debts afterward. 
3
The combinations of international trends and domestic 
responses to the crisis led to different pathways in 
housing financialization during the past decade. This 
chapter focuses on the effects from the perspective 
of households, considering the different forms of 
indebtedness: besides mortgage debt, the chapter 
covers the issue of consumer loans, arrears in utility bills 
and informal moneylending practices as other sources 
of debt. Although mortgages are the most visible and 
most often mentioned form of household debt, in 
reality, other forms are highly prevalent and have been 
increasing in recent years, especially among lower-
income households.
The increase in living costs materializes in several ways 
in terms of housing indebtedness. Besides mortgages, 
which are the most obvious channel, consumer credit 
also plays a more and more important role in financing 
housing purposes, despite their higher interest rates 
and more risky nature. These credits often provide an 
opportunity for poorer households to access additional 
sources to cover their monthly budget; serve as the 
part of own capital, which needs to be provided for a 
mortgage; or serve to finance renovation costs. Besides 
loans, the rise of utility costs in the last decades 
compared to household income also had a large effect 
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on the risk of becoming indebted through late payments 
and related penalty fees. Finally, informal moneylending 
often serves as a last resort for emergency situations 
among the poorest households, implying a great risk for 
households to fall into a spiral of debt.
Growth of consumer loans and 
personal loans 
Rapid household debt expansion is often followed by a 
stark economic downturn and leads to financial crisis. 
Some Southern and Eastern European governments 
targeted over-indebtedness after 2008 with various 
policies, not necessarily providing specific services for 
the indebted households, but more generally through 
the enhancement of employment, poverty reduction, 
and welfare policies (such as unemployment benefits, 
social housing, or childcare benefits). Several measures 
have helped households to leave behind a part of their 
debts, but it has been a highly unequal process, as 
mostly better-off households could get rid of their loans 
completely, while poorer ones have been left indebted 
without any significant help.
As low-income households have been excluded from the 
new cycle of mortgage loans in the post-crisis period 
due to the introduced stricter conditions, they had to 
rely more and more on risky and expensive consumer 
loans. These are easier to acquire and can be used to 
cover various housing-related costs such as paying rent 
or small renovations, covering household appliance 
purchases or even deposits. Although consumer loans 
might offer a temporary solution to households, they 
may hold an even larger risk of a permanent debt trap.
Yet, the widespread insolvency of households that 
resulted in thousands of auctions and evictions, 
should not have occurred. Many households have 
Several measures have 
helped households to 
leave behind a part of 
their debts, but it has 
been a highly unequal 
process, as mostly 
better-off households 
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become indebted due to the lack of alternatives for 
secure housing. Rental markets have been gradually 
deregulated, or, more precisely for peripheral Europe-
an countries: have never been regulated, and renting 
often became a more expensive option than buying. 
Instead of promoting incentives that facilitate the 
indebtedness of households, governments should 
have developed affordable housing solutions beyond 
individual ownership. This would have meant that the 
risks of providing and financing housing are borne by 
larger institutions and not by individual households.
Lessons from an inadequate debt cancellation poli-
cy in Slovenia [Ajda Pistotnik]
The debate on debt cancellation after the crisis has 
been a more and more discussed idea within the EU, 
as a possibility to survive periods of debt crises. In 
Slovenia, the focus was put especially on housing 
debt cancellation, which has been promoted by the 
newly formed United Left oppositional political party 
since 2014, when the party entered the Slovenian 
parliament. The proposition was then offered by the 
Ministry for Work and Social affairs that was headed 
by the Social democrats (one of the coalition partners 
in the government). It introduced a bill that would 
write off debt for the poorest households. Instead of 
proposing a systemic improvement, the idea behind 
the bill was to offer a one-time debt relief for the 
financially most distressed households. The initiative 
offered a single voluntary debt cancellation. Not only 
the cancellation has been voluntary, but the amount 
limit remained a suggestion as well. As a result, this 
debt relief mechanism did not reach the needed 
impact.
According to the 2014 study of the Statistical Of-
fice of the Republic of Slovenia, 37% of households 
experience housing costs as a heavy burden, while 
24% struggled with at least one late repayment 
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(Pistotnik, 2015). The debt relief program included 
120 voluntarily joined municipalities (out of 212 
total). Besides the Ministry for Labor and the Finan-
cial Administration, 93 companies participated, rang-
ing from insurance companies, utility companies, 
property management companies to banks (Pistotnik, 
2015), covering a total amount of €1,976,221.
As the creditors are legal institutions, offering debt 
relief to their debtors seemed to be a logical choice, 
since they would benefit from tax reliefs in the 
form of deductible expenses. Therefore, the focus 
of how debt cancellation was presented was on legal 
institutions and improving their financial situation, 
instead of on the welfare of households. 
The main disadvantages of the debt relief program 
were the unequal territorial help due to the measure’s 
voluntary nature, and the high dependence on the 
creditor’s financial capacity. Many people couldn’t 
participate in the debt relief program, as conditions 
were often too strict and the time period for the 
write-off remained vague. Since the introduction of 
the bill in 2015, followed by the participation of the 
above legal entities, there has been no significant 
increase in the number of beneficiaries, also because 
of the one-off nature of the measure.
Altogether, more systematic interventions are 
necessary in order to negotiate the debt of 
households and to bring the political nature of this 
debate to the surface.
The stigmatization of consumer loans 
among the poor 
While the number of newly disbursed consumer loans 
accelerated similarly to housing loans in the pre-crisis 
years, it significantly reduced during the years of the 
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crisis due to higher flexibility and income sensitivity. 
Furthermore, as criteria are generally looser for consumer 
credit than mortgages, and because higher interest rates 
are attached to these riskier loans, consumer credits 
much more easily went default. Between 1995 and the 
peak of 2008, consumer credit went over an even more 
radical development than mortgage loans, expanding by 
150% in Europe (Chmelar, 2013). Thus, access to short-
term loans played a crucial part in European households’ 
portfolios during the credit boom years.
As restrictions on mortgage lending became more 
prevalent after the 2008 crisis, consumer loans received 
larger attention. Personal loans may provide an 
alternative to mortgage loans in the case of lower value 
properties, and they have been issued not only by banks 
but other non-bank financial institutions that followed 
a business model that allows riskier clients. However, 
households with mortgage loans are also more prone 
to take consumer loans: the increase of mortgage cre-
dit had an effect on consumer loans as well. Consumer 
loans often serve as a means to cover housing-related 
costs, especially among the poorer households. These 
loans may function as a basis for covering downpayment 
in mortgage applications, or cover household renovation 
and refurbishment, or buying household appliances. 
Often consumer loans are taken to cover another loan’s 
repayment, or a deposit for housing, filling holes in the 
household’s budget. 
From the boom of consumer loans to widespread 
debt executions in Czechia [Lucie Trlifajová]
In Czechia, homeownership functioned as a state-
subsidized road to economic security, with an absence 
of foreign currency mortgages in the pre-crisis 
years. When mortgage loans were introduced, it was 
mostly directed towards middle-income groups. The 
15 golden years of consumer loans started in 2001 
when debt collection became privatized, favoring 
Between 1995 and 
the peak of 2008, 
consumer credit went 
over an even more 
radical development 
than mortgage loans, 
expanding by 150% in 
Europe.
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one interest group (a network of actors ranging from 
public institutions, lawyers, private debt collectors, 
and politicians) over an extremely lucrative business. 
Consumer loans had a lack of regulation until 2015, 
where non-banking institutions had no registration 
obligation. The business model of debt collectors was 
based on the clients’ inability to repay their debts, 
hence realizing high profits through high interest 
rates, interest on arrears, and penalty fees. This 
has led to a large part of the Czech population be-
ing under execution processes for their debt, which 
means that they lose a significant part of their 
monthly income to the bailiff. 
In relation to debt, two debates have been dominant: 
while mortgage debt is seen as a confirmation 
of individual responsibility and success, the 
stigmatization of consumer loans and over-
indebtedness is seen as a sign of inability to live up to 
society’s (neoliberal) expectations, and these debtors 
have been excluded from access to fundamental 
rights and protection. Predominantly this narrative 
frames the poor in general and the Roma in 
particular. This internal hierarchization is related to 
changing labor market conditions, and to how this is 
translated into the rights of citizens.
Often, the income seized from debtors by bailiffs 
leaves them with less money than the national poverty 
threshold. According to Finance Watch, this is the case 
in Croatia, Czechia and Slovakia, among other European 
countries (see Fig. 1011). As a result, many debtors fall 
into a poverty trap.
11 https://www.finance-watch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Re-
port_Human-dignity_final_with-annex.pdf.
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Arrears on utility bills and the growing 
energy divide 
Arrears on utility bills have been one of the many 
ways the 2008 crisis had an overwhelming effect on 
household indebtedness, affecting the daily life of 
families across Europe. Energy poverty describes the 
condition when a household experiences “the absence 
of socially and materially necessitated levels of energy 
services” (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015, p. 35). With 
the rise of the crisis, such vulnerabilities came to the 
fore even more visibly, stemming from a combination of 
structural inequalities, rising energy prices, poor housing 
conditions, and inadequate policies to tackle the issue.
The crisis focused attention on the growing energy 
divide of European households, which has been an 
increasingly discussed and acknowledged issue on a Eu-
ropean level. A significant difference is visible among 
households both in spatial and social terms (Bouzarovski 
and Tirado Herrero, 2017), where Southern and Eastern 
Europe report a higher percentage of energy poverty; 
and deprived households across Europe are increasingly 
unable to meet their basic energy needs. 
Figure 10. Limits on funds (in 
euros) that can be seized from 
debtors through debt execution. 
Source: Eurostat, Finance 
Watch.
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Throughout Europe, the energy performance of most 
standing buildings is inefficient according to mo-
dern requirements. Despite a range of opportunities 
for households to heat their dwellings, 7% of citizens 
in the European Union are unable to keep their homes 
adequately warm12. As a result, many households reduce 
their energy consumption to heat only one room in the 
dwelling or resort to risky coping strategies for domestic 
heating, such as burning inadequate, polluting fuels 
(e.g., textiles or lacquered wood) in unsuitable devices 
such as old stoves. These practices may lead to health 
issues. 
The crisis has caused an increase of arrears and the non-
payment or late payment of utility bills. Across Europe, 
every tenth citizen was having trouble with paying their 
utilities on time in the worst years of the 2008 crisis13 
(2012-2013) with significant core-periphery differences 
that persist. Data of the European Observatory of Energy 
Poverty indicate large percentages of the population in 
countries of Southern and Eastern Europe – e.g., Greece 
(36%), Bulgaria (30%), Serbia (28%) and Croatia (17%) 
– with arrears on utility bills in 201814 (see Fig. 11). 
Unaffordable energy bills can also be seen as one of the 
elements of high living costs leading to indebtedness. 
Still, the lack of systematic data and indicators on 
household indebtedness and disconnections downplay 
their importance as energy poverty dimensions.
12 Inability to keep home adequately warm - EU-SILC survey: https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/product?code=ilc_
mdes01.
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Penalty fees and interests further increase the amount 
of arrears. In certain cases, households can rely on a 
protected consumer status, which temporarily keeps 
them from being disconnected from the service. 
However, even in these cases the debt still increases and 
can lead to debt enforcement on their income, or at the 
end of the process can also lead to the loss of the home. 
Household debt is a key aspect of energy poverty, having 
an uneven effect: bad housing conditions often paired 
with higher energy expenditures, as bad insulation or 
inadequate energy provision in dwellings can increase 
the costs of utility for the most in-need households.
Utility debt, disconnections and collective action in 
Barcelona [Sergio Tirado Herrero]
Hundreds of thousands of Spanish citizens do not 
have secure access to regular energy supply due to 
late or non-payment of bills and indebtedness with 
utility companies. Data from the Spanish Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions indicate that 
more than 900,000 people had their energy supply 
interrupted at least once during the year 2016 due 
to “household financial difficulties”. These account 
for self-disconnections (e.g., households “voluntarily” 
canceling supply contracts or going without pre-paid 
butane gas cylinders when needed) and for supplier-
enforced cut-offs following arrears and indebtedness 
(Tirado Herrero et al., 2018). On top of that, an 
undetermined number of people living in irregular 
Figure 11. Arrears on utility 
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housing conditions with whom utility providers 
refuse to sign service contracts are excluded from 
legal access to domestic energy and water.
The growing visibility of energy poverty had much 
to do with the 2008 crisis and its aftermath, 
revealing hardships of vulnerable households in 
the dramatic increase of utility arrears and servi-
ce cut-offs. In response, advocacy and civil society 
organizations adopted energy poverty as their 
central claim, criticizing the unfair practices of large 
energy corporations and their resistance to state 
and civil society action to support customers in 
need. The Alliance Against Energy Poverty (Aliança 
contra la Pobresa Energètica, APE), a network of 
citizens affected by energy poverty and activists 
founded in 2013, has called attention to the rising 
problem of energy and water poverty. Transforming 
their voice into direct action, the social movement 
has successfully re-politicized the issue of energy 
poverty, leading to the prohibition of electricity, 
water and gas cut-offs for households at risk of 
housing exclusion by Law 24/2015 of the Parliament 
of Catalonia in 2015.
By creating a community of mutual support, APE 
helps to reclaim agency for vulnerable households 
against more powerful state and corporate actors. The 
majority of participants at APE’s bi-weekly collective 
advisory assembly are in deep energy poverty, either 
having been disconnected, or having outstanding 
debts with utility providers, or being threatened 
with disconnection. Many of its participants face an 
insecure housing situation as well, either in danger of 
being evicted or living in social housing or occupying 
dwellings formerly vacated by banks and other 
financial institutions.
The experience of APE provides evidence for the 
potential of collective action, being able to transform 
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individual vulnerable conditions into a network of 
solidarity and resistance, creating a possibility to 
break the previous limitations of policy discussions 
about household debt and utility disconnections. 
Despite progress, challenges persist. Accumulated 
household debt for water, electricity and natural gas 
remains a growing, unsolved issue as utility providers 
refuse to write off debts accumulated by vulnerable 
households protected from disconnections by Catalan 
Law 24/2015.
Informal moneylending on the 
periphery of society
Indebtedness as a global phenomenon has attracted 
much attention both in public discourses and in 
academia since the 2008 crisis, but lesser attention 
has been paid to the financial portfolios of the poor 
and the complexities of usury or informal debt. The 
term usury refers to the exploitation of unequal 
bargaining power, placing one party in excessive 
obligations towards the other. In individual cases, it is 
a purposeful exploitation of misfortune or weakness 
both on a legal and moral basis. However, looking at 
usury as a systemic problem, it can also exist in the 
form of social discrimination, characterizing a social 
group that faces over-indebtedness or poverty, and 
lack any alternative to solve these problems other than 
turning to usurious contracts. Nevertheless, informal 
practices of moneylending are often seen as an act of 
help, translating into a kind of favor or act of solidarity 
among a community where other forms of institutional 
help are absent (Palomera, 2014).
One of the key trends behind the crisis was the 
financialization of housing, and low-income groups 
were also systematically incorporated into the financial 
system, in order to have access to basic necessities 
Turning to informal 
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such as housing and other durable resources. Embedded 
in this social context, usury as a form of informal 
moneylending serves as an alternative to the formal 
micro financial system where there is a dire need for 
personal small loans on the one hand, but also serves 
as a flexible, innovative response to a lack of wage or 
income-generating opportunities in the search for social 
mobility opportunities on the other hand (Durst, 2015).
The debt trap beyond formal institutions: usury 
lending in Hungary [Judit Durst]
After the collapse of state socialism in Hungary, a 
“peculiar kind of flexible and petite capitalism” (Durst, 
2015, p. 51) came into being in the economically more 
disadvantaged regions of the country, representing 
high rates of unemployment and low incomes. One of 
the greatest victims of such changes was the Roma 
population, being over-represented among both the 
poor and unemployed, living in deep deprivation 
compared to the total population.
Popular discourse in Hungary often blames the poor 
for their indebtedness due to their lack of financial 
literacy and “living in the present”, and even civil 
society experts often express concerns about their 
lack of planning ahead in regard to their borrowing 
practices. Few discourses can be found that are 
empowering rather than victimizing the poor in such 
circumstances. To counter these prejudices, several 
authors emphasized the complex portfolios of Roma 
citizens, living under highly unstable circumstances 
and sporadic income opportunities (Durst, 2015; 
Gosztonyi, 2017). 
Even though a zero-tolerance law has been passed 
in 2011 about usury in Hungary, facing immediate 
imprisonment, it did not treat the problem at 
its roots. The main reasons of informal lending 
stem from two key aspects of indebtedness: the 
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colony15 dissolution programs where Roma families 
were moved into self-contained housing, but also 
faced increased utility costs for which they had no 
additional sources to cover these expenses. The other 
factor of indebtedness relates to the withdrawal 
of welfare services and the parallel expansion of 
punitive measures by the state, such as giving fines 
for illegally collecting wood for heating during winter 
months.
Regarding informal lending practices, the main actors 
are moneylenders who provide loans to the poor at 
high interest rates. These moneylenders are often lo-
cal municipal employees or neighbors, who are able 
to “help” indebted citizens in cases of emergency. 
The decentralization of welfare governance resulted 
in the increase of the power of local governmental 
15 Colonies are segregated living environments, where dwellings are 
in a badly degraded condition and lack a sufficient comfort level.
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actors, such as mayors and their familial circles. As 
a consequence, these actors are able to exploit their 
power and manipulate the public work scheme and 
the House Purchase Subsidy (distributed according 
to the number of children a family has or promises 
to have in the future) in a way to acquire cheap 
properties in the village, which can be used as 
private rental housing for the local poor households. 
Establishing and strengthening political clientelism 
through these mechanisms allowed local mayors 
to regulate the settlements and their vulnerable 
citizens. Here, loans are only able to alleviate everyday 
crises, but also create a dependency towards the 
creditor, reconfiguring financialized relationships 
even in the poorest regions.
The above-discussed sources of household indebtedness 
and types of non-mortgage debt can eventually all lead 
to the loss of housing, and are often closely related to the 
incapacity to repay mortgage loans. From a public poli-
cy perspective, it is highly problematic that information 
about these types of debts and how the various forms of 




The study of debt and financialization from a structural 
perspective has gained increased attention in the post-
crisis years, but also cultural approaches focusing on 
discourses and narratives around housing have been 
placed in the center of social science research. The 
present chapter highlights both developments in terms of 
research on housing and financialization. First, we discuss 
debt as part of capitalist accumulation, highlighting 
how social movements incorporated structural critiques 
in their resistance. Second, we highlight the “soft side” 
of financialization, how it changes narratives and moral 
imaginaries about everyday life and perceptions on lived 
experiences of indebtedness.
Debt as a form of accumulation by 
dispossession 
Dispossession materializes once someone loses their 
means of livelihood, becoming deprived of either place, 
home, or citizenship. It has been orchestrated through 
mechanisms of capital accumulation, commodifying 
urban space in modes that have not existed before. The 
mechanism of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 
2003) commodifies property markets in a way that it 
creates a conflict between housing as a basic need, be-
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ing part of social rights, and housing as a speculative 
good that is rather looked at as an asset with an 
exchange value that facilitates capitalist accumulation. 
Considering housing, the 2008 financial crisis revealed 
how housing and finance are connected in manifold ways 
through the logic of investment funds and banks, the 
securitization of credit, or debt collection mechanisms 
and foreclosures. Furthermore, the role of states has 
been considerably reshaped in managing real estate 
markets. 
A movement response to a rising number of 
evictions in Serbia [Ana Vilenica]
In Serbia, to have access to loans, an individual’s 
total asset serves as collateral, which means in many 
cases their privately-owned houses and apartments 
are accounted for credits even if it is not a personal 
mortgage loan. During the crisis, before massive 
evictions have started, the eviction procedure was 
privatized in 2011. Previously, public court bailiffs 
were managing the evictions, but because of 
“inefficient enforcement”, legislative changes made 
it possible to employ private bailiffs by the creditor. 
This measure has been adopted by the center-right 
Democratic Party government, responding to the 
pressures coming from the European Union. 
While subsidized housing paid by workers’ monthly 
payments was around 50% in Yugoslavia, during the 
early 1990s a state decision allowed public companies 
and state institutions to sell off these societal flats. 
Housing funds slowly ceased to exist, and as a result 
of the transition, Serbia today has a very high ratio, 
98%, of homeownership. As in other post-socialist 
countries, owners are often fighting poverty, and 
struggle with increasing utility and maintenance 
costs. As a consequence, in the course of years, many 
households accumulated debt, aggravated by the 
effects of the crisis.
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With another legislative turn in 2016, private bailiffs 
were renamed “public bailiffs”, while the control of 
evictions and irregularities in the procedure are now 
in the hands of bailiffs themselves instead of the 
court. At the beginning of 2019, bailiffs were assigned 
around 300,000 individual cases of debt according to 
information held by the Public bailiffs’ chamber and 
other creditors such as public utility companies and 
telecommunication companies. The privatization 
of bailiffs gave rise to a new mechanism enabling 
profit-making from evictions through real estate 
seizures and auctions. 
These changes didn’t go unanswered. The first 
individual acts of resistance led to the growth of a 
nationwide movement, and an organization, called 
the Roof16, that stands at the forefront to fight 
for housing justice (Vilenica and Pantović, 2019). 
Years of intensive street mobilization pressured the 
government to react, and the Law on Enforcement 
has been changed in the summer of 2019. However, 
it has been done so without public participation. 
Instead of trying to address current grievances 
of the processes of eviction, the state chose to 
criminalize actions of solidarity, by increasing fines 
for the obstruction of the eviction procedures. The 
narrative message of the law is to discourage people 
from resisting and fighting for social justice, while 
the state chose to protect bailiffs and creditors 
instead of its citizens.
The engagement of private bailiffs is a pattern that is 
common to some peripheral countries of Europe. The 
institutional framework for debt enforcement described 
in the Serbian case is also similar in Hungary and Croatia. 
Households mainly just encounter private companies in 
their struggle with debt: first the financial institution 
or utility provider, then the debt collector, and finally 
16 https://zakrovnadglavom.org/.
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the private bailiff (engaged by the state and thus 
having more legal possibilities). This means that, with 
the lack of state intervention and state institutions for 
managing cases of over-indebtedness, these situations 
are handled only according to market logic.
Moral imaginaries of homeownership 
and debt
From a cultural point of view, the mortgage contract can 
be considered a novel configuration for combining social 
and market ties. The financialization of housing is not 
only enacted in structural constraints, but also builds on 
forming moralities around capitalism as a process, and 
how debt, property, and citizenship relate to each other. 
Mortgage creates new types of economic productivity, 
but also new risks and forms of wealth, reshaping relati-
ons and intimate lifeworlds.
First, mortgaged households are embedded in the 
social production of space where spatial and temporal 
reordering takes place as processes of suburbanization, 
transnational circuits of foreign-currency lending, and 
changing cityscapes through large-scale developments. 
Second, the financialization of housing transforms 
family relations based on the decisions made around 
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loans, how budgeting in a household is decided, or 
how it affects intergenerational transfers. Third, 
financialization rearranges classes and politics in regard 
to the household’s market position, to its members’ life-
chances created or constrained by variegated levels of 
housing debt, and in regard to how they relate to social 
movements, or pursue legal action (Lewicki, 2019).
A common example of how the above processes 
interlink is the complementary nature of mortgages and 
intergenerational transfers for the property acquisition 
of young households. For instance, in Hungary, young 
households who do not have access to intergenerational 
transfers (financial support from their parents) take 
more mortgages in order to secure their housing (Szé-
kely, 2018). Thus, those who are in a less stable financial 
situation to begin with (since their parents cannot 
support them) typically get more indebted at the 
beginning of their working lives. When they do not have 
a long enough work contract or high enough income, it 
had been common for their parents to act as guarantors 
or to use their parents’ house as collateral. This way of 
drawing family into financialized relations has caused 
the eviction of many elderly from their homes in the 
aftermath of the crisis. 
A Polish example of how mortgages shape relations 
within the family [Mateusz Halawa]
Eastern-European peripheral cities have experienced 
the spread of new mortgage lending in the first 
decades of the century. These contracts have been 
forging social ties, reconfiguring actors, resources 
and cultural meanings attached to mortgage, 
constituting a new kind of “mortgage sociality”. The 
term refers to the phenomenon of the financialization 
of citizenship, rooted in indebtedness, individual risk-
taking, and private housing property as the means for 
social mobility towards a post-socialist middle-class 
identity. Mortgage plays an increasingly significant 
Young households who 
do not have access 
to intergenerational 
transfers (financial 
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parents) take more 
mortgages in order to 
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role in generating moral discourses on monetary 
gains and losses, how the future is imagined for either 
individuals and families or even cities and national 
economies. The everyday process of managing 
financial constraints have been explored through an 
ethnography among young Polish couples (looking at 
how mortgage shapes their lives and moralities.
The mortgage is domesticated into affective 
relationships and the financial sector is able to harness 
the informal, gendered work of social reproduction. 
Mortgagors and their families undertake relational 
work in order to service the mortgage and shape 
their household money to match values and 
aspirations, involving also the management of 
financial instruments. The rise of the mortgage 
culture among middle-class households becomes the 
instrument to create a new ideal of an autonomous 
household, pursuing freedom from work by treating 
housing as a real-estate investment. Moreover, the 
autonomous gesture of becoming independent is 
bound up in matters of managing transfers from 
parental households: the unaffordability of housing 
plays a central element in narratives about an 
imagined good life. As Olcoń-Kubicka and Halawa 
(2018) show, the moral imaginary around money 
and finances often focus on family wealth from a 
multigenerational perspective. Being supported by 
parents to take a loan pairs with ideals on social 
mobility: taking a mortgage is a decision based on 
the idea that their children won’t have to. Finally, 
everyday ethics is increasingly embedded in digital 
practices, meaning that softwares are increasingly 
becoming actors in decisions on household 
relational work: managing expenditures, discussing 
financial patterns, mortgage options or holidays. To 
conclude, even though popular discourses of family, 
intimacy, and a good life are spheres still imagined 
as untouched by market mechanisms, the research 
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showed that under late capitalist financialization of 
the peripheries these notions are being transformed 
in relation to economic pressures and neoliberal 
imaginaries.
Altogether, debt has come to be inherently linked with 
access to housing on various economic and social scales. 
From a macro perspective, investing in housing through 
the debt of individuals has become a form of investing 
surplus capital on financial markets. For states, pushing 
for more debt is a way to spur housing production without 
needing to invest much public resources in housing 
provision. For better-off and middle-income households, 
access to cheap mortgages is a way to leverage their 
wealth and to improve living conditions, while for lower-
income households debt is not necessarily a possibility, 
but something they are pushed into as the only way to 
secure housing for themselves. For many households, 
different forms of debt (with personal and consumer 
loans gaining importance) related to various housing 
costs are intertwined and lead to a debt trap, with the 
threat of losing their home altogether. The poorest 
households can typically only access the riskiest and 
most expensive segments of formal lending, or often 
revert to informal moneylending practices in order to 
cover their housing costs and other expenditures. Thus, 
the struggle of households related to indebtedness has 
come to be inherently linked to the struggle for decent 
housing.
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Various interests relating to debt
The debt of households is a decisively political issue, 
in which many different interests come together, and 
there are also significant power dynamics to consider. 
In order to intervene in situations of over-indebtedness 
of households, these different interests need to be 
accounted for. 
From the investment perspective, there are various 
actors interested in increasing the total volume 
of outstanding debt to households. This includes 
international institutions such as the European Central 
Bank and large international financial corporations. 
For them, more lending to households is a way to 
safely invest more available capital. However, financial 
institutions also want to avoid lending under too risky 
circumstances, since this leads to the default of many 
loans. Thus a contradictory situation develops where 
these institutions will strive to put out as much cre-
dit as possible to households which are as risk-free as 
possible. As a result, some have access to loans with very 
favorable conditions and will experience the benefits of 
a global flood of money, while others’ credit applications 
are systematically refused. 
When a crisis hits and many loans start defaulting, 
financial institutions will be interested in clearing their 
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portfolios of defaulted loans relatively quickly – which is 
where debt collector companies step in. Debt collection 
very plastically shows how the debt of households has 
become a significant market in the years following the 
2008 crisis. The legal structures protecting the interests 
of creditors and making sure they have a way to claim 
their money are important prerequisites for debt to 
function as a market. These legal frameworks include 
the possibilities of debt executions, foreclosures and 
evictions.
On the other hand, periods of crisis also open opportunities 
for this market-based framing to be questioned. These 
are periods when more pressure can be put on financiers 
and debt collectors for renegotiating the terms of 
repayment. Thus, with sufficient self-organization and 
pressure from the debtors in difficulty, periods of crisis 
can be turned to their benefit. It is important to push 
for different forms of debt relief and debt reduction 
because otherwise the income of households (which is 
anyway often reduced in periods of crisis) will keep being 
channeled towards large financial actors. When there is a 
crisis situation, there is a chance to decrease these flows 
of financial extraction. In the long term, however, it is 
important to develop housing and livelihood solutions 
that will depend less on overinclusive forms of individual 
indebtedness and which can protect households’ 
resources. (We bring some examples below.)
States are also interested in increasing lending to 
households because it generally increases consumption 
and spurs economic growth. However, the position of 
states in different parts of the global economy will also 
be different in this respect. The debt of households 
in peripheral countries will often be exposed to 
international capital flows and will thus not only be a 
question of domestic policy. After their accession to 
the EU, households and companies of the European 
periphery gained access to relatively cheap loans which 
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flooded their markets. A few years after the 2008 crisis, 
the European strategy for crisis management was to 
push more money onto the markets, which led to a new 
wave of lending. This cyclical nature of extensive lending 
which then crashes is rather systematic of dependent 
forms of financialization. 
Besides loans, it is important to highlight that household 
indebtedness is also produced by arrears of payment in 
various services. This debt in arrears is often linked with 
credit-based debt, and the two combine into cumulated 
difficulties of payment and a debt trap. A particularly 
harsh consequence of this situation can be when 
someone loses their home because of indebtedness, but 
their remaining debt is still executed from their income. 
How to intervene as engaged 
researchers – shaping the narrative
The common narrative around household debt is to 
claim that “people live beyond their means” and are 
“irresponsible”. This is coupled with general anti-poor 
narratives around indebtedness. In the face of this 
narrative, it is important to show how household debt is 
a result of structural pressures, and to put forward the 
argument that indebtedness can be countered not by 
more “responsibilization”, but by providing fundamental 
services independently from the market logic. Engaged 
researchers can have an important role to play in 
shaping the public discourse around these issues. 
A way to do this is to make institutions, processes and 
risks around debt more visible and more understandable. 
This can help people in seeing what they take on with 
a loan, and also shows what their room for maneuver 
is. Highlighting previous processes around debt, as well 
as historical or contemporary examples of how it has 
been tackled can also be a very inspirational source 
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of knowledge. A further role can be to support the 
social movements that are active around household 
indebtedness in order to make them more visible and to 
channel in specific forms of lacking expertise.
One difficulty for those raising public awareness around 
this topic is the lack of adequate data on household 
indebtedness. It is very rare to have aggregate data 
on the scale of households concerning their different 
types of debt and arrears. Thus, in most countries, 
only estimations can be made by combining different 
data sources. The other option is to rely on household 
surveys where households are asked about their ove-
rall indebtedness – however, these are not regularly 
taken and usually do not cover the whole population. 
Further problems are that debt is usually not calculated 
into poverty measurements (only income levels are 
accounted for), and that debt is usually attributed to 
one debtor, whereas household relations are much more 
complex.
Building structures that point 
towards a different housing system
In the short term, debt restructuring and debt 
cancellation mechanisms are necessary to reduce 
the social harm of over-indebtedness. This can take 
various forms and can be targeted towards different 
social groups. The importance of the politics of debt 
restructuring is to open the possibility for questioning 
the legitimacy of the total outstanding stock of 
household debt, and to see it as a sphere of negotiation 
similar to the debt of companies or states. 
In the mid and long term, however, debt cancellation 
and debt restructuring will not solve the fundamental 
problems of the lack of access to housing and other 
basic services. Thus, new solutions to households’ needs 
In the short term, debt 
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should be built up. Otherwise, under the capitalist logic, 
new waves of lending and then of over-indebtedness will 
merely continue to reproduce themselves. In the field 
of housing, we need to build stable, affordable housing 
systems which are not exposed to market volatility and 
are not reliant on extractive forms of individual lending. 
Important aspects of such housing programs would be: 
 ▪ to be affordable in the long term, 
 ▪ to have an institutional structure which avoids 
speculation, 
 ▪ to be collectively or publicly owned and managed 
in a way to secure the predominance of residents’ 
interests,
 ▪ to develop mechanisms of solidarity within housing 
systems, which would allow for more resilience to 
crisis. 
In order to develop these solutions, the political pressure 
and collective voice of many indebted households need 
to be heard, and governments also need to take more 
responsibility in providing for the basic needs of their 
residents. Social movements organizing around access 
to housing or around household indebtedness have an 
important role to play in pushing for these steps. 
Examples of movements against debt 
and an outlook on 2020
There are a number of movements against public debt; 
especially the public debt of developing countries (such 
as CADTM17 or the Jubilee Debt Campaign18). A common 
grassroots tool in organizing citizen awareness around 
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consciousness about the political nature and devastating 
consequences of large public debt was widely raised in 
Southern European countries after the 2008 crisis, as 
a response to Troika interventions demanding more 
austerity.
Movements questioning household debt emerged after 
the crisis of 2008 in several places around the world. In 
the United States, groups emerging from the Occupy 
movement20 started questioning whether all individual 
debt should be repaid, organizing primarily around 
student debt and other consumer loans. Recently, 
with the level of consumer loans and credit cards 
reaching unprecedented heights, the issue of individual 
indebtedness has come to the fore on the agenda of 
US movements again. In Spain, the housing movement 
PAH21 has become very visible globally with its strategies 
of pressuring banks into negotiations with indebted 
households. In Eastern Europe, defaulting forex debtors 
had organized themselves in Hungary (Florea, Gagyi 
and Jacobsson, 2018) and in Croatia (Mikuš, 2019b). 
Responses to a rise in the number of evictions have also 
emerged: for instance, the Serbian movement the Roof22 
had concentrated on eviction blockades, thus making 
the violence of housing dispossession visible. 
Beyond directly housing-related initiatives, work on buil-
ding up debt relief and debt cancellation schemes are 
also important. Movements for debt cancellation include 
groups that demand the re-regulation of private debts 
by the government, basing their argument around how 
certain forms of household lending were illegitimate 
(this was the strategy of Hungarian forex debtor groups, 
for instance). In other cases, they will directly intervene 
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canceling the outstanding debt. These actions are often 
financed by donations specifically for this purpose. 
(Some examples are the British initiative called the Bank 
job23 or the US-based Rolling Jubilee24.) Debt-related 
actions can be amplified by art and media interventions; 
which is a strong tool for raising awareness around a 
complicated issue. The above-mentioned Bank job is also 
a good example for this.
The currently unfolding economic crisis in the wake of the 
COVID-19 outbreak shows that the debt of households 
can actually be negotiated, as some countries are 
introducing moratoria on loan repayments. However, a 
payment moratorium does not necessarily benefit the 
debtors, since interest will typically still accumulate 
during this period, and due to the lengthened repayment 
period, in the end debtors pay more. What would be 
truly progressive is the negotiation of debt relief and 
debt cancellation programs. It is alarming that in this 
situation some governments are not giving direct 
support to those who have lost their income, but are 
estimating that households will survive through taking 
further loans. This is a strategy that directly points 
towards a debt trap. Rather, the current situation of 
collective crisis should be used to push for possibilities 
that represent the interests of households instead 
of corporations or governments. In many cases, these 
possibilities did not exist under a period of capitalist 
expansion and growth. However, the deep crisis that 
we are currently entering shows – yet again – that 
structural shifts need to happen. 
23 https://bankjob.pictures.
24 http://rollingjubilee.org.
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